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Feminist challenges to the constraints of law: Donning uncomfortable robes? 
 
Kate Fitz-Gibbon1 and JaneMaree Maher2 
 
Abstract Legal judgment writing mobilises a process of story-telling, drawing on 
existing judicial discourses, precedents and practices to create a narrative relevant to the 
specific case that is articulated by the presiding judge. In the Feminist Judgments projects 
feminist scholars and activists have sought to challenge and reinterpret legal judgments that 
have disadvantaged, discriminated against or denied women’s experiences. This paper 
reflects on the process of writing as a feminist judge in the Australian Project, in an intimate 
homicide case, R v Middendorp. Drawing on the work of Judith Butler on intelligibility, 
iterability and the communality of violence and vulnerability, this article argues that feminist 
judgments necessarily require some uncomfortable compromises with unjust gendered 
institutions. While ‘donning the robes’ may be an uncomfortable process, a feminist re-
articulation of the law’s carceral power serves to unsettle and challenge some aspects of 
gendered oppression, even though it cannot unsettle the operation of the institution. The 
article concludes that effective feminist interventions by members of the judiciary may 
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require donning robes that are not entirely comfortable in order to persuade and advocate for 
change.  
 
Keywords Defensive homicide Feminist judgment Feminist practice Legal discourse 
Sentencing 
 
Introduction 
 
The 2010 R v Middendorp case (hereafter Middendorp), where Luke Middendorp fatally 
stabbed his estranged-partner Jade Bownds in the back and was subsequently found guilty of 
a lesser charge of defensive homicide, 3  created considerable controversy in Victoria 
(Australia). The decisions of both the jury and sentencing judge in the case raised legal issues 
in Victoria about the operation of the new offence of defensive homicide and whether it had 
been successful in improving legal responses to intimate partner homicide. Defensive 
homicide was introduced in November 2005 to address the gender biases of the previously 
available (and heavily discredited) partial defence of provocation. Instead of heralding a 
resolution to the contested field of provocation, the Middendorp case re-animated long 
standing legal and feminist issues concerning the way the provocation defence privileged 
forms of male violence. And of course last though not least, the case provided yet another 
instance of an intimate partner homicide where violence against women leaving a 
relationship occurred and was seemingly in part sanctioned (and at least partially empathised 
with) by the legal system. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 R v Middendorp [2010] VSC 202 (19 May 2010). This case was finalised in the Victorian Supreme Court, 
which is the highest court for the state of Victoria.   
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In this paper, we explore how the opportunity we were given in the Australian 
Feminist Judgments Project to rewrite the Middendorp sentencing judgment required us to 
rethink our approach to feminist analysis and advocacy and also our understanding of the 
production and application of legal knowledge. Erika Rackley (2010) has argued that all 
judgments are a form of persuasive story telling and the emphasis in the Project was to tell 
new stories about gender, justice and the law. Our objective in rewriting Middendorp was to 
embed feminist legal analyses of gendered violence against women in the sphere of 
provocation and self-defence through rewriting and re-imagining both the sentence imposed 
in Middendorp - considerably harsher in our feminist rewriting than in the original judgment 
- and the reasoning that supported it. In this process, the opportunities and constraints of 
producing such a judgment, intelligible both as a legal discourse and as a feminist 
intervention, became apparent. How did we reconcile our responsibilities to act as feminist 
scholars in the context of a troubling, male centric criminal justice system, a system Carol 
Smart (1989) has urged feminists to avoid? How could we effectively and responsibly 
animate feminist reasoning within discourses that so often silence, victimise or vilify women 
while creating a judgment that was persuasive and authoritative in that context? How could 
we enact carceral violence as feminist advocates against violence? Rethinking both intimate 
partner violence and legal judgment as collaborative and relational processes allowed us to 
navigate the feminist objectives and legal constraints of this project, although a comfortable 
resolution remained elusive.  
 
Throughout this rewriting experience, Judith Butler’s concepts of iteration and 
intelligibility from Bodies that Matter (1993) offered an opportunity to critically engage with 
the ways that legal citation and precedent create fictions of authority, legitimacy and 
transparency. Butler’s attention to vulnerability, in particular in the discussions about 
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vulnerability and violence from Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning (2007) assisted in 
rethinking the nature of violence inside intimate partner homicides as communal and 
relational rather than private or individualised. Butler’s interventions relocate these instances 
of intimate partner violence more directly in a continuum of violences and exclusions that 
constrain and diminish women’s opportunities and participation. Although Butler (1986, 
2004) is clear that neither sex nor gender are fixed, her work has illuminated the schemas of 
heteronormativity that regulate and define sexed and gendered bodies. Lloyd (2013, 825) 
identified this operation as “heteronormative violence … violence enacted in the ordering and 
classification of bodies according to the norms of sex, gender, and sexuality”. In cases of 
intimate partner violence, this pre-existing regulatory operation that “defines the kind of 
behavior attaching to heterosexual masculinity and femininity” (Lloyd 2013, 824) is invisible 
yet constitutive in the legal processes that identify individual victims and alleged offenders. 
Within the institutions of law, these structures of gendered violence and how legal officers 
and courts interpret acceptable norms of femininity and masculinity present ongoing 
challenges for women who face intimate partner violence and for feminist actors, such as 
judges, who seek to interrupt or recast processes and outcomes.  
 
These extant constraints within the justice system meant that acting as a feminist 
judge required us to reconsider the context of the individual case and judgment while 
managing the structural and procedural barriers women and feminists still face in navigating 
the criminal law. The process of working in a system that continues to regulate and produce 
male privilege generated some uncomfortable strictures as legitimate feminist anger and 
critique had to be muted and rephrased; but through the process the relational and contingent 
nature of law and its operations became more visible to us. Acting as feminist judges 
revealed to us the ‘forcible citation of [norms]’ (Butler 1993, 232; cited in Lloyd 2007, 64) 
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that constitute gender, and the extent of the fictions of precedent that underpin the operation 
of the legal system. Questions of dissent, disagreement and variation in judicial reasoning are 
often elided in supporting the fiction of a single authoritative ‘voice’ of that judgment.   
 
As Rosemary Hunter (2012a, 137) has observed, appropriating the judicial robes 
‘[exposes] the contingency and biases of existing decisions and [disrupts] the unique 
authority of the courts and legal decision-making’. The collaborative and relational nature of 
judgment making that Hunter (2012a) identifies became a useful and productive framework 
for understanding both judgments about violence and the violence itself as relational rather 
than individual. Butler’s argument that violence and vulnerability too are relational pushed us 
to understand that recreating legal judgments offered the opportunity not only to address the 
injustice of the single judgment in focus but also to reimagine gendered vulnerabilities as 
normative rather than exceptional within extant legal discourses. In this respect, the process 
of feminist judgment writing offered the opportunity to more systematically uncover the 
operation of heteronormative violence (Lloyd 2013) producing male privilege in the courts 
on both sides of the bench.  
 
In the following section we outline the Middendorp case and its limitations and 
implications in the context of recent attempts to reform the Victorian law of homicide to 
better account for women’s experiences of violence. We then turn to Butler’s theoretical 
propositions regarding intelligibility as a framework to destabilise and relocate judicial voice 
and authority as contingent and open to disruptive remaking. In the final section of the paper, 
we consider Butler’s account of common or relational vulnerability as a mechanism to embed 
core feminist understandings about the continuum of vulnerability, violence and exclusion 
within the processes of this case and in the operation of legal processes more generally.   
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The Middendorp case 
 
The Middendorp case marked the first – and up to the point of its abolition,4 the only - 
male perpetrated intimate homicide to result in a conviction for the Victorian offence of 
defensive homicide. Defensive homicide was introduced in Victoria in November 2005 
alongside the abolition of the controversial partial defence of provocation. The offence was 
introduced as part of a wider package of criminal law reform in Victoria aimed at reframing 
the law of homicide to better respond to lethal violence and in particular, the different 
contexts within which men and women commit homicide.5 Two specific motivations were (1) 
the difficulties that battered women often face in raising a complete defence of self-defence, 
and (2) the character denigration of deceased female victims through the criminal trial 
process. Consequently, a perception had emerged that women – both as victims and offenders 
– were ill served by the existing Victorian law of homicide, legal structure and culture.  
 
The offence operated whereby a person who killed another person believing that their act was 
necessary to defend themselves or another person, but had no reasonable grounds for that 
belief, could be convicted of defensive homicide, rather than the more serious offence of 
murder (Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005, s. 9AD). 6  The offence was not intended as a 
replacement for the provocation defence, rather it was introduced to provide a ‘halfway’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 (Vic). The Act came into effect from 1 
November 2014. See Fitz-Gibbon (2015) for further discussion of the abolition of defensive homicide.  
5 This focus was largely driven by the work of Jenny Morgan (2002).  
6 For further analysis of the nine-year operation of the offence of defensive homicide, see Fitz-Gibbon (2012, 
2014, 2015), Fitz-Gibbon and Pickering (2012), Toole (2013) and Tyson (2011, 2013).  
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category between murder and the complete defence of self-defence for persons who kill in 
response to prolonged family violence.  
 
Beyond defensive homicide, other reforms also introduced in 2005 to address these 
issues included changes to the law of self-defence and the introduction of social context 
evidence reforms to assist the court in better understanding the contexts within which a 
person may use lethal violence in response to family violence. In highlighting the ‘critical 
importance’ of the family violence evidence provisions for women who kill an abusive 
partner, Toole (2014, 480) argues this aspect of the reforms: 
 
directly and intentionally confronts the problem women have faced in having their 
belief in lethal conduct considered genuine and reasonable as it provides women 
with the opportunity to explain the fear, desperation and lack of options that can lead 
them to resort to lethal violence.  
 
Through the combination of these reforms it was hoped that women’s experiences of violence 
could be more adequately understood and responded to by the criminal courts.  
 
Less than five years after the introduction of the reforms, the 2010 trial and 
sentencing of Luke Middendorp reignited debate concerning the operation of Victorian 
homicide law and the extent to which the 2005 reforms had achieved meaningful change in 
the law’s response to lethal violence against women. Luke Middendorp and Jade Bownds had 
been involved in a defacto relationship since late 2007. There was a history of violent 
incidents in the relationship; some of which resulted in the police being called and other 
incidents that were reported to family and friends (Middendorp, at 7-8). At the time of Jade  
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Bownds’ death, the couple were separated and there was a Family Violence Intervention 
Order (FVO) against Luke Middendorp.7 Despite the FVO, at the time of her death, Jade 
Bownds was staying with Middendorp in a house that the Salvation Army had arranged for 
him on the condition that she did not live there.  
 
On 1 September 2008, Jade Bownds went to the house to feed their dog with a male 
friend. The facts offered by Middendorp at his trial indicated that a verbal dispute arose, 
during which Jade Bownds produced a knife and raised it at Middendorp in a threatening 
manner (Middendorp, at 10). The outcome was that Jade Bownds was stabbed, allegedly 
defensively, in the back four times by Middendorp who was twice her size and weight. While 
the stabbing occurred inside, neighbours witnessed the final moments of the fatal attack as 
she stumbled out of the house, at which point Middendorp shouted “You got what you 
deserved, you filthy slut” (Middendorp, at 9). Middendorp did not call an ambulance and 
Jade Bownds died in the street.  
 
Following a contested trial in the Victorian Supreme Court, Middendorp was found 
not guilty of murder and guilty of the lesser offence of defensive homicide. This verdict 
meant that the jury accepted that Middendorp had a genuine (albeit unreasonable) fear for his 
own safety. He was sentenced to a maximum term of 12 years imprisonment with a non-
parole period of eight years imprisonment in what the judge described as ‘among the more 
serious’ examples of the offence.8 Widespread community concern and scholarly critique 
emerged in the wake of Middendorp (Capper and Crooks 2010; Fitz-Gibbon 2012; Fyfe 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The terms of the FVO required that Middendorp did not “assault, harass, threaten or intimidate” Jade Bownds 
(Middendorp, per Byrne J at 4).  
8 At the time this was the longest sentence to be imposed in a defensive homicide case.  
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2010; Howe 2010), following which in August 2010 the Department of Justice (the DOJ)  
published its Review of the offence of defensive homicide: Discussion Paper (2010), which 
represented the first step in the DOJ’s review of the offence and canvassing of options for 
reform.9 
 
Arguably one of the most disheartening aspects of the Middendorp case is the 
persistent traction gendered narratives of victim blame have despite many decades of legal 
reform driven at least in part by feminist activism and analysis (Douglas 2012; Graycar and 
Morgan 2002; Morgan 1997). In the Victorian context it is also worth noting that the 
Middendorp case occurred less than a decade after the highly publicised trial of James 
Ramage in 2004 for the death of his estranged wife, Julie.10 James Ramage was convicted of 
manslaughter by reason of provocation, claiming at trial that he had been ‘provoked’ to kill 
by his estranged wife after she told him that the marriage was over, that sex with him 
repulsed her and either ‘said or implied how much better sex with her new friend was’.11 The 
trial was covered heavily in the media and by legal commentators who critiqued the dominant 
focus on the actions of the female victim throughout the trial and called for the subsequent 
abolition of the partial defence of provocation. The Ramage case clearly demonstrated to the 
Victorian community the prevalence and dangers of victim blaming in our courts. However, \ 
as illustrated by the use of gendered descriptors, such as ‘troubled young woman’ to describe 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Regardless of the Middendorp case, the VLRC (2004) had recommended that a review of the law be conducted 
five years following the introduction of the reforms.  
10 R v Ramage [2004] VSC 508 (9 December 2004). For further discussion of victim blaming and the 
provocation defence, see further Fitz-Gibbon 2014, 56-65.  
11 Ramage, per Osborn J at 22.  
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the victim in Middendorp, 12 these narratives were neither confined to the operation of the 
provocation defence nor to the Victorian law pre-reform.  
 
The discursive frameworks that enabled such narratives to occur are unfortunately not 
unfamiliar: women’s experiences of violence have long been ‘othered’, minimised and 
misunderstood by the criminal justice system (Douglas 2008; Fitz-Gibbon and Pickering 
2012; Hudson 2006; Walklate 2008). Male violence remains intelligible within the operation 
of law. As a consequence, male intimate partner violence is too often rationalised in our 
courts on the basis of outdated notions of ownership and violated masculine pride. Women’s 
efforts to confront violence or defend themselves are frequently used to redistribute blame 
and make the violence equivalent; an outcome in this case as Jade Bownds’ behaviour was 
scrutinised and found ‘wanting’. This narrative provided a clear example of the punishing 
operation of the ‘liberal dichotomy of [women as]… autonomous agents or … vulnerable 
victims’ (Hunter 2012b, 217). Jade Bownds’ efforts at self-defence or potentially even at 
fighting back meant that she was unable to comfortably occupy the position of idealised 
victim within the legal narrative. This uncomfortable fit was maintained despite the fact that 
she was deceased at the hands of Luke Middendorp and that he was completely uninjured in 
the fatal incident. This representation of the event, and the culpabilities of those involved, 
also resonates with one of Butler’s (2007, xii) observations about the existing ‘ways of 
distributing vulnerability [and the] differential forms of allocation’ that create and enforce 
injustice and other forms of violence and erasure. 
 
Butler’s (2007) argument in Precarious Life emerges in response to the ‘heightened 
sense of vulnerability’ across the Western world in the early decades of the twenty first 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Middendorp, per Bryne J at 17.  
	   11	  
century. She identifies that visible or known forms of injury create important knowledge 
about the shared or common possibilities of loss and vulnerability: ‘One insight that injury 
affords is that there are others out there on whom my life depends’ (xii). For us, Butler’s 
argument about common and shared vulnerabilities is important in a number of ways. When 
the law approaches partner violence it most often does so as a form of singular or privatised 
violence enacted in one single relationship. When violence is allocated in such contexts, 
responsibility only moves between partners as it did in the Middendorp case, failing to 
address the systemic and authorising gendered and heteronormative narratives that underpin 
such violence. We maintain a ‘dichotomy between “real” criminal assault and what takes 
place in the home’ (Carline and Easteal 2014, 60), which works alongside a ‘mismatch 
between what victims experience as violence and what players in the criminal justice system 
tend to conceptualise as a criminal act’. When such violence is inaccurately reported, 
represented or reviewed by the courts, the law actively operates to reinforce and reiterate 
binarized gender norms: which as McNeilly suggests, can be understood as ‘a violent 
operation’ (2014, 266). In effect, the ‘law imposing violence is a form of violence’ (Loizou 
2007, 105) that preserves and reinforces injurious gendered allocations of violence and 
vulnerability. In Middendorp, this pattern was evident in the original sentencing judgment 
which failed to give adequate recognition to the vulnerability of the victim and the history of 
violence against her in the relationship. Subsequently, the judgment accepted Luke 
Middendorp’s account of fear and reciprocity in his fatal stabbing of Jade Bownds.  
 
It is arguable that a key animating feature of domestic and familial violence is 
grounded in these existing gendered binaries and norms that support male privilege and 
facilitate the domination and control of women (Gill and Mason-Bish 2013). Thus although 
such cases are all specific and unique in one way, it is important to register the ‘wider issues 
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of misogyny’ (Stanko 2001, 326) that underpin such events.  While significant reforms in 
sexual assault and intimate partner violence have been achieved, low rates of conviction and 
impoverished sentencing of male perpetrators reinforces the need to understand such violence 
as more than essentially private in nature (see Hodge 2011, 73; VLRC 2004).  This re-
location of the meaning and impact of the violence against Jade Bownds should not be seen 
as a silencing of this particular victim experience, but rather as Butler (2007) suggests, as a 
form of injury that may be understood to extend beyond the borders of the individual event or 
experience.  The violent functioning of heteronormative regulations within law support the 
invisibility of women’s victimisation, initially through male actions of violence directed and 
then as courts assess and understand that masculine violence. In this case, it erased Jade 
Bownds and recreated gendered fictions and precedents of law that excused such violence. 
The discourses and schema that make women responsible for and vulnerable to victimisation 
are reinforced in such judgments.  
 
The Feminist Judgments Project 
 
The persistence of such biased responses to issues that deeply concern women, advocates and 
feminist scholars, and slow rates of change in response to law reforms were the impetus for 
the development of the feminist judging methodology. The methodology emerged in Canada 
where a group of feminist legal scholars decided to re-write a number of legal judgments 
pertaining to the equality clause of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as if the 
presiding judge had attended to the well-established critiques of masculine bias and silencing 
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in all aspects of the law.13 The methodology has gained international momentum, with 
projects now completed in England and Wales and Australia,14 ongoing in Ireland and 
Northern Ireland,15 and new feminist judgments projects have commenced in the realm of 
international law and in the United States (Feminist International Judgments Project and the 
US Feminist Judgments Project). This model of critical interventions into legal judgments has 
now extended to environmental law16 and Children’s Rights.17 We were involved in the 
Australian Feminist Judgments Project, which was led by Professor Heather Douglas and Dr 
Francesca Bartlett (University of Queensland) with Dr Trish Luker (University of 
Technology, Sydney) and Professor Rosemary Hunter (Queen Mary University of London). 
 
In explaining how the judgments become distinctively ‘feminist’ per se, Douglas et al 
(2014b: 7) observe that: 
 
This does not mean referring to feminist theories as legal authorities, but rather, 
bringing a feminist consciousness to bear on one’s understanding of litigants, facts, 
evidence and legal rules.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The first six Canadian judgments were published in 2008 in the Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 
(vol.18). The judgments are also available from the Women’s Court of Canada website: 
www.thecourt.ca/decisions-of-the-womens-court-of-canada/. 
14 The outcomes of the project have been published in a range of contexts in each jurisdiction, see Hunter, 
McGlynn and Rackley 2010 and Douglas et al. 2014 respectively. 
15 Details of the Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments can be accessed online: http://www.feministjudging.ie  
16Details of the Australian Wild Law Judgments project can be accessed online: 
http://www.earthlaws.org.au/events/wild-law-judgment-project/ 
17Details of the Children’s Rights Judgments Project can be accessed online: 
http://www.liv.ac.uk/law/research/european-childrens-rights-unit/childrens-rights-judgments/ 
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For each feminist judgment, there is an accompanying commentary that outlines the reasons 
for the choice of case and highlights the feminist challenges to the original judgment. While 
criminal cases such as Middendorp are readily identifiable as feminist projects, rewritten 
judgments in each country have also addressed taxation, welfare, immigration, environmental 
and constitutional law.  
 
In the projects, feminist legal and criminological scholars operate within a well-
defined set of criteria: the central aspect of which is to use the frameworks, language and 
principles of legal judgment writing in order to create an “authentic” judgment that satisfies 
both the existing legal conventions and feminist aspirations (Douglas et al 2014b: 1). In broad 
terms, the feminist judging methodology is an aspirational one, where the immersion within 
existing conventions offers the opportunity to remake the law. Our objective in selecting 
Middendorp for feminist rewriting was twofold: to challenge the gendered narratives that 
supported and legitimised the fatal violence against Jade Bownds, and to relocate 
individualised accounts of gendered violence against women within a broader continuum of 
the violent regulation and reiteration of gendered norms that is both social and legal.  
 
In our discussion of the Middendorp case,18 we argued that though the violence was 
individual and directed, fatally, towards Jade Bownds, the impact of the sentencing judgment 
reinforces gendered social relationships and norms in which women may experience violence 
and men may commit it. Butler’s accounts of both the complexity of legal citation (1993) and 
of the extension of violence and injury beyond the individual instance (2007) offered a 
conceptual framework to reveal and support such a proposition. Drawing on Butler’s (1993, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See further Fitz-Gibbon, Tyson, and McCulloch 2014; Maher 2014.  
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2004) work on citation and iterability in the following section, we explore how the explicit 
citational processes entailed in producing a feminist judgment operate to reveal the 
collaborative and communal nature of all forms of judgment. The feminist judgment process 
thus is disruptive not only in the new judgment produced, but in what it reveals about the 
production of legal judgments more generally. As Margaret Davies (2011, 3) has suggested:  
 
many of the messages I receive about law are in fact informed or underpinned by 
some total or general view of law, which everyone, especially those with a legal 
education, has probably internalised to some degree: this is unavoidable since the very 
idea of law is normally now based around the ideal or concept of a totality or system. 
But it is important to remember that that ideal is simply a fiction  − an influential one, 
but nonetheless a fiction or assumption held in place by large numbers of people 
acting as if it is true.   
 
Locating the inherently unstable aspects of judgment writing at the centre of the process 
allowed space for us to refuse to accept extant fictions about male violence and exculpatory 
legal narratives. Such paradigms do not exist independently but require remaking in each new 
judgment: our commitments included a refusal to collaborate in such fictions that 
underpinned the original Middendorp judgment. While Smart’s query (cited in Hunter 2012a) 
about the problems of collaboration with the law is important, this collaborative process 
directly aimed to make visible the shadow spaces (Rackley 2012) between legal judgments, 
academic practices and women’s lived experiences of gendered violence, thus allowing for 
the emergence of new narratives and stories about gendered justice.  
 
Becoming feminist judges 
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Some aspects of this process of donning the robes for our team were relatively easy: we 
decided that we would always use Jade Bownds’ full name and that our sentencing judgment 
would be addressed directly to the offender, Luke Middendorp. Importantly given that 
judgments are always stories (Rackley 2010), we began our judgment by describing the 
events immediately surrounding Bownds’ death and Middendorp’s grotesque and unrepentant 
behaviour in the period immediately following the stabbing. We were able with relative ease 
in the discussion of the factors to be considered in sentencing to introduce some principles 
and information from feminist research about patterns and incidences of intimate partner 
violence, and about the intensified risk for women during the period of separation.  
 
To allow the judgment to better reflect this vulnerability of the victim and the context 
within which the violence took place, we increased the sentence length significantly and did 
not give weight to the outdated character evidence for Middendorp that was cited by the 
original presiding judge. We believed this was essential to adequately recognise in law the 
dangers that women face when attempting to extricate themselves from a violent relationship. 
Conceptualised by American law professor Martha Mahoney (1991) as ‘separation assault’, 
the period of separation for an abused woman is often characterised by male demonstrations 
of control, power and violence and ultimately a heightened risk of lethal violence. In the 
Middendorp case we sought to redress the failure of the original sentencing judgment to 
recognise the heightened vulnerability of a woman killed during the period of separation.  Yet 
this increased sentence located our judgment within the carceral operations of the law and 
enacted a form of violence too, that conflicted with feminist critiques of the violences and 
exclusions of law. A key aspect of the project was that we had to use existing judicial tools: 
the option of recasting the law completely – of not sentencing Luke Middendorp for example 
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– was not available to us. As feminist judges, we had to judge (Douglas et al. 2014a). The 
sentence had to be remade within the constraints of law, so it could be understood within the 
existing framework. Following Butler’s (2007) intervention about the communal nature of 
injury and violence, this required that we explicitly acknowledged our enactment of violence, 
as well as our vulnerability.   
    
The best option available to us, we considered, was to listen differently to the facts of 
the case as presented at trial and in the original sentencing judgment – which were that Jade 
Bownds, was stabbed in the back four times and Middendorp, weighing over 100 kilograms, 
stood over her gloating while she died. By reinterpreting these facts we were able to create a 
‘feminist’ judgment that more accurately reflected the power imbalances so often observed in 
intimate partner homicides. As Duhacek (2014) has suggested, justice claims are calls or 
pleas to others to listen: listening to the story of Jade Bownds’ death through a gendered lens 
was an effort to listen more closely to aspects of her story that were not central in the original 
judgment. In the original sentencing judgment, the story emphasised the culpability of Jade 
Bownds, the victim, in her own death. In our judgment, the constraints and legal limitations 
that regulate women’s security in situations of intimate partner violence underpinned our 
interpretation of what occurred.  
 
These moves prompted further reflections about feminist engagements with 
seemingly intractable institutions and the gendered discourses that persist despite efforts to 
achieve sustained social and legal change. In analysing these points of frictions, Butler’s 
(1993) concepts of citation, intelligibility and iteration were very helpful in understanding 
how these collaborative processes in feminist judgments (Hunter 2012a) could operate to 
reveal and strengthen the diversity and potential of the law. By acting as if these fictions 
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about intimate partner violence were not wholeheartedly shared and not totally true 
(following Davies’ 2011 intervention), we were able to realise and recognise “an alternative 
history” (Rackley 2012, 392) for this instance of male partner violence and challenge its 
intelligibility at law. Such a move however, again reflecting the value of Butler’s account, 
had to be made within the existing constraints and articulations in order to be recognised as a 
judgment.  
 
Butler’s account of intelligibility 
 
 In Bodies that Matter (1993), Butler argues that the law operates using a number of 
discursive fictions in order to secure authority and create intelligibility. Precedent is 
identified as the pre-existing law that is brought to bear on the case at hand. But Butler avers, 
this citation of that which is past, is in fact a remaking. In this transaction there can be no 
original that is actually cited, since the new judgment is in fact a new articulation. The fiction 
of the law is that new judgments reinforce older legal norms unproblematically, even if they 
extend them. After Butler’s intervention, it is much clearer that reference to legal precedent is 
always actually a process of re-invention rather than the citation of an authoritative original 
position or proposition. As Lloyd (2007, 2013) has observed, Butler’s work locates all 
utterances as citation and as such challenge the idea of an autonomous speaking subject.  This 
process is in part acknowledged in the ‘law-making’ function of judgments, but Butler’s 
intervention reveals more directly how the fiction of authority is mobilised and supports the 
law’s drive to preserve itself (Loizou 2007). This operation offers both cover and confidence 
to judicial voices. It makes fully visible the always already present space of ‘discretionary 
decision-making’ that Hunter (2010) identifies as part of judgment while seeking to secure 
authority through citation.  If all practices of judgment in fact must re-make what went 
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before, in feminist judgments then, we have the same and legitimate opportunity to 
destabilise and unsettle the gendered violences of the law.  
 
For us, in this case, the opportunity to increase Middendorp’s sentence from the 12 
years maximum term originally imposed – a mid range sentence in comparison to the 20 
years available for the offence – to 17 years was to actively rework precedent through a form 
of citation and then a re-iteration that extended the law’s reach. We were able to say that this 
defensive homicide case was a ‘grave example’ of the offence - aggravated by the lack of 
remorse displayed by the offender and the extreme power imbalance between the victim and 
offender. Although lesser sentences had previously been given for the offence of defensive 
homicide, we believed these factors required a much harsher sentence in this case. We were 
able to challenge the relevance of the positive character evidence from 2008, well before the 
killing of Jade Bownds, which was noted and weighted in the original sentencing judgment. 
The preceding sentences under the defensive homicide provision, thus reworked, became a 
platform for achieving a more just outcome. But we did not abandon the framework of the 
sentencing judgment or eschew the violences of judging: these elements were shaped by the 
conditions of legal intelligibility that were a key aspiration of the feminist judgment 
projects19.  
 
These questions of voice, collaboration and potentially collusion prompted further 
reflections on processes of judicial authorship. In fact, as Butler’s notion of intelligibility 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  In the volume, Irene Watson’s ‘response to Kartinyeri (Kartinyeri v Commonwealth of Australia (1998) 195 
CLR 337) is not written as a judgment as she contends that white man’s law would not be adequate’ 
(McLoughin 2015).  
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makes clear, judgments are always shared speech acts that recycle existing gender norms. 
Notions of convention, precedent and shared authority underpin each judicial re-
interpretation. The ‘voice’ of any single judgement is designed to speak in concert with the 
voices of the judges who have spoken before: disagreements, variations and distinctions are 
eschewed. These judgements are  animated by the law that has been previously elaborated. 
As such articulations too often re-inscribe gendered biases and injustices and pretend to 
individual certainty through reference to historical and collective authority, the process of re-
articulation and citation can be understood as both complicity and collaboration. When this 
articulation is actively engaged as a form of feminist practice, it can become a platform for 
feminist decision making that disturbs existing discourses even though it cannot escape them.  
Repetitions, even when imitative, may denaturalise and make explicit “how the natural is 
produced” (Lloyd 2007, 54).  
 
We would argue these practices of citation, contest and re-articulation are already 
evident in the justice system. Some current justices of the Victorian Supreme Court, notably 
Justice Betty King and Justice Elizabeth Hollingsworth, while not using the term feminist, 
draw explicitly on feminist research about familial violence and speak to women’s equality 
and access in their judgments (Fitz-Gibbon 2014, 258-9; Tyson 2013). For example, in 2010 
in sentencing Soltan Azizi for the murder of his wife, Justice King took the opportunity to 
make the following important comments about women’s rights:  
 
Every woman and man in this country is entitled to the protection of the law. 
Marriage does not sanction or give permission to any husband to treat his wife in a 
manner this is inconsistent with her rights as a fellow human being. No man has the 
right to order or direct a woman to behave in a certain way, merely because he is her 
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husband. And of course the same applies in reverse. Both women and men have a 
right to be protected within a marriage. Matters such as this used to be referred to 
many years ago as domestic murders. It makes it no less significant or painful in 
terms of consequences than any other type of murder. (R v Azizi [2010] VSC 1112, 
per King J: at 24) 
 
In another welcomed 2014 judgment, while sentencing Angela Williams for the defensive 
homicide of her husband,20 Justice Hollingsworth expressly noted the range of behaviours 
that can constitute family violence and acknowledged the difficulties often associated with 
producing evidence of such violence at trial:  
 
There is no evidence that you or the children had ever complained to anybody about 
family violence … But the lack of complaint is not uncommon in cases of family 
violence. Family violence, by its very nature, often occurs behind closed doors. 
Outsiders, even close friends and family, may not be aware what is going on within 
a relationship. Family violence is not limited to physical abuse; it also includes 
sexual abuse and various forms of psychological abuse, including intimidation, 
harassment, damage to property, and threats of abuse. A number of acts that form a 
pattern of behaviour may amount to abuse, even though some or all of those acts, 
when viewed in isolation, may appear to be minor or trivial. (DPP v Williams [2014] 
VSC 304, per Hollingsworth J: at 20) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Williams was sentenced to a maximum term of 8 years with a non-parole period of 5 years imprisonment 
(DPP v Williams [2014] VSC 304).  
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These judgments broaden the framework of the law and thread feminist possibilities and 
contestations into the existing and seemingly unchanging fabric. They are also important as 
they intervene in and recast normative responses to intimate partner violence from ‘within’ 
the law. These iterations of law extend and resituate existing understandings of gendered 
violence and create new narratives that embed feminist insights about the nature of violence. 
Research has long recognised the difficulty that law reformers and legal scholars face in 
engaging legal practitioners in the law reform process to ensure that a change in the law is 
accompanied by a change in legal culture and practice (Easteal 1998; Erez and Rogers 1999; 
Fitz-Gibbon 2014; Friedman 1969; Hampel 2015). Yet, the process of judgment enacted by 
these judges, the use of feminist scholarly and activist insights within these iterations of the 
law; represent both the possibility of change in the law and productive collaborations within 
and across judgments.   
 
As Hunter (2012a) has suggested is characteristic of feminist judgments and feminist 
knowledge, our writing process in this work was totally collaborative: drafts were initiated 
and then circulated to every member of the team multiple times.21 The judgment and the 
commentary were all co-authored and we were judges not only of the case but of each other 
too. How many times could we say ‘chilling’ and still seem ‘judicial’? To what extent could 
we introduce material re-orienting the pre-existing ‘facts’ in the sentencing judgment so that 
the nature of the gendered violence and silencing – both Middendorp’s and that of the 
criminal justice process – became more visible?  We all wanted to be named on each piece of 
writing: our editors, however, in line with the legal conventions said only one sentencing 
judge could ‘speak’, although the author names could be acknowledged underneath. We 
invoked then the figure of Justitia, the blind Lady Justice that carries the moral force of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Our ‘team’ included Danielle Tyson and Jude McCulloch.  
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law and is armed with scales and a double-edged sword. We saw this figure as gesturing 
towards the complex and double-edged nature of feminist engagements with the law, as 
embodying the contingent and collective nature of the process (Hunter 2012a). But she also 
suggests that no one perspective can offer a full vision; that a range of insights and 
knowledge need to be used. Through our own collaboration in the Australian Feminist 
Judgments Project, established itself as a collaborative project, 22  the disruptive and 
productive opportunities of citation and iteration become more visible and explicit, and thus 
reinforced the potential for on-going challenge and change from within the institution.  
 
Rethinking violence and judgment as relational and communal 
 
For us, participation in the Australian Feminist Judgments Project made visible the 
collaborative work of judging, where judgments are best understood as contingent (Hunter 
2012a). It also emphasised that the violence perpetrated by Luke Middendorp against Jade 
Bownds created forms of injury beyond the confines of that case; when courts accept 
exculpatory narratives of violence facilitated by the policing and reinforcing of binarised 
gender norms, the impacts are clearly widespread. Butler’s (2007) proposition that both 
vulnerability to injury and the commissioning of violence are shared and relational was 
important here too. Mobilising a sentencing judgment as a feminist judgment took us directly 
to the violence of incarceration and deprivation of liberty. This position reinforced our own 
complicity in structures of violence and justice. In our view, this need to rethink both 
concepts of justice and violence and to accept the complex constraints of this process is a 
central aspect of feminist engagements with the law. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Over the course of the project judgment and commentary writers met with the project leaders in various 
Australian states to workshop key issues and draft .See Douglas et al (2012b: 10-13).  
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Duhacek (2014) discusses the initiation of Women’s Courts in the territory that was 
formerly recognised as Yugoslavia as a mechanism to recreate and reconceive possible forms 
of justice.  She offers a brief account of the women’s courts that have appeared in a range of 
countries since the 1970s; all, she argues with a focus in centring the testimonies of women 
who “have suffered grave injustice, … have been deprived of their rights” (2014, 3) and have 
been subjected to multiple forms of violation. While the opportunity of the Australian 
Feminist Judgments Project is not directly analogous to such a process, Duhacek offers two 
important observations that do speak to the objectives of this project and to our own 
objectives in rewriting and recreating the Middendorp sentence. 
 
Duhacek’s first valuable observation addresses the ways in which Women’s Courts 
dislocate the individuated ‘rights of the accused’ in the process of seeking new forms of 
justice. She argues that:  
 
The goal of the process is much less on the emphasis on individual names, rather it is 
focused on naming and, as precisely as possible, designating the social, political, 
economic forces which have offered structural support to, and thus led to, injustice. 
(2014, 3)  
 
This mechanism for embedding the structural and social forces, forces that support both 
intimate partner violence against women and the legal narratives or discourses that make such 
violence intelligible to courts, was crucially important in our rewriting of this sentencing 
judgment. In our view, the Middendorp sentencing judgment reprised a now well-established 
pattern of excusing and allowing male violence, in spite of “[d]evastating feminist critiques 
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of the age-old concession to ‘passion’ in the form of homicidal fury unleashed on women by 
furious men [that] are now legion” (Howe 2004, 59). The law (mis)understood Middendorp’s 
actions in the context of his relationship with a ‘troubled’ woman, as has too often been the 
case in past judgments. It is somewhat ironic that one of the VLRC’s (2004) stated objectives 
was to facilitate the documentation and presentation of ‘social context evidence’ about 
gendered violence and urged community education about the impacts of family violence 
particularly on women. They identified ‘social context evidence’ as wider than the type of 
evidence conventionally accepted in intimate partner homicide cases and as including 
targeted attention to the gendered impacts of intimate partner violence. At the same time, the 
Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 amended the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) to enshrine a wider 
definition of family violence, incorporating physical, sexual, and psychological abuse 
(including intimidation, harassment, damage to property, or threats (s 9AH(4)). Yet the effect 
of this clause in Middendorp was to reassert existing heteronormative narratives that accept 
masculine violence and obscure women’s experiences of family violence. The relationality 
and complexity of intimate partner violence can be readily seen in the moves forward and 
back in legal reform and intention, in interpretation and judgment and in communication and 
outcome.  
 
The second valuable observation offered by Duhacek (2014) focuses on the processes 
of abstraction that characterise formal legal processes. She argues these processes often result 
in the fading away of the injustices suffered by women; an obscuring of the violences and 
violations that constituted the injury. In the Middendorp case, as we have noted, the concrete 
events of Jade Bownds’ death were obscured by the operation of the offence of defensive 
homicide and the narration of the relationship as a mutually violent one. This move served to 
undermine the seriousness of the act of lethal domestic violence and the culpability of the 
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offender. This discursive undermining is captured by the judge’s description of the event of 
killing as a “foolish act” (Middendorp, per Byrne J at 17). The use of discursive techniques at 
law to minimise the seriousness of gendered violence against women is not a new 
observation and is well noted in prior research (Carline and Easteal 2014; Douglas 2008; 
Easteal 2001; Fitz-Gibbon 2014).  Yet the practices of obscuring and silencing the violence, 
as Middendorp shows are resilient and persistent. One of the key aims of our feminist 
judgment was to bring the violence – and the injustices – back into direct focus, even if as 
sentencing judges we also then participated in carceral violence too. In making violence 
visible, our own vulnerabilities and complicities in the commission of violence are evident.  
 
Our rewriting of the Middendorp case was clearly subject to the limitations of 
complicity and collaboration that concern Carol Smart. There is perhaps no way to avoid the 
perils of engagement with institutions that have worked to silence feminist contestations so 
effectively and we are likely to be limited by our inability to “envision a different legal 
system when we are so embedded in our own legal paradigm” (Davies 2011, 1). Yet, as 
Duhacek (2014) suggests, one way of re-envisioning justice is to name as precisely as 
possible the structures of injury, violence and complicity. As feminist judges in this case, the 
relational and collective nature of both violence and judgment was made clear. Rosemary 
Hunter, in responding to Smart (2012a, 144), has observed “while feminist judgment-writing 
projects obviously fail to decentre law, they do, at least to some extent, decentre that iconic 
legal figure, the judge”. In a sense though, following both Hunter and Duhacek, we argue that 
the greater inclusion of structural social forces and evidence, clearer recognition of 
complicities and shared vulnerabilities also decentres the operation of the law itself since law 
and effects in this framework is understood to emerge in and through “relationality … as an 
on-going normative dimension of our social and political lives” (Butler 2007, 27). If we take 
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Butler’s (2007, 26) proposition seriously we are all agents and instruments of both violence 
and vulnerability. Although Butler does not use the term collaborative, her attention to 
violence and vulnerability and the “community in these conditions” (Butler 2007, 19) 
illuminated the ongoing potential for change inherent in the collective and collaborative 
practices and outcomes of the Feminist Judgment Projects.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In negotiations of the legal conventions of feminist judging: no ‘new’ facts at sentencing, 
required by the process to impose a carceral sentence, bound by previous decisions and 
framed within a legal system that silences and often punishes women victims of intimate 
partner violence, feminist actors are faced with the unpalatable knowledge that the existing 
epistemological tools will always in part reinscribe the binaries and erasures even when they 
are turned to other purposes (Grosz 1986). Yet, as Davies (2011) has more hopefully argued, 
in acting reflectively “sensitive to questions of gender and aware of the implications of their 
interventions”, in fact does change existing systems. In rewriting the sentencing judgment in 
Middendorp through a collaborative gendered lens, we were able, in our view, to create an 
intelligible but reworked account of Middendorp’s violence that more fully honoured Jade 
Bownds, a responsibility we all felt very keenly. Our judgment aimed to illuminate how 
patterns of violence are currently made intelligible at law and how they might be contested 
through citation and iteration as remaking, through the instabilities of heteronormativity 
(Lloyd 2007) that are produced there. In understanding both violence and judgment as 
communal rather than bounded, in moving away from an individuated and rights based 
account of law, we can perhaps see the possibility in the rewritten Middendorp of affirming 
that male violence is no longer intelligible or acceptable, no longer an acceptable social or 
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legal fiction “held in place by large numbers of people acting as if it is true” (Davies 2011).  
While such interventions are always only a partial and imperfect change, as Douglas (2012) 
has argued, deeper and more systematic change in legal understandings and processes will 
take time and will be built on incremental rewriting of existing legal paradigms and 
principles.   
 
Our judgment process can be understood as an immersion within and re-enactment of 
commonplace and daily processes of law-making. The premise that the authority of the law is 
inherently unstable and open to re-making actually operates at both the structural and the 
instrumental levels: the law is in effect changed by each new iteration and thus new 
animating principles can, and should, be mobilised by legal actors within such re-iterations, 
even if change is slow, uneven and sometimes invisible. Given that the law has these tools of 
re-making and re-animating available, they can be used for feminist purposes. But such a 
process is uncomfortable in many ways: how do we reconcile our responsibilities as feminist 
scholars and voices with the constraints, biases and violences of the law? Does donning such 
robes compromise aspirations for an equitable and adequate accounting for gendered 
violences and biases? Does the imposition of carceral violence through sentencing really 
serve to create justice and visibility? There are no ready answers to such questions and 
judicial robes, whether feminist or not, are uncomfortable. Yet, as Elizabeth Grosz (1986) 
observed some decades ago, there will be no one way to challenge structures that oppress and 
victimise women: discomfort is a likely and potentially productive way forward too.  
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